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Abstract
Given a set of integers {a1, . . . , aN}, the 3SUM problem requires finding ai, aj, ak ∈ A such
that ai + aj = ak. A preprocessing version of 3SUM, called 3SUM-Indexing, considers an initial
offline phase where a computationally unbounded algorithm receives a1, . . . , aN and produces a
data structure with S words of w bits each, followed by an online phase where one is given the
target b and needs to find a pair (i, j) such that ai + aj = b by probing only T memory cells of
the data structure. In this paper, we study the 3SUM-Indexing problem and show the following.
New algorithms: 3SUM-Indexing with preprocessing has a simple algorithm with S = O(N)
and T = O(N), and another with S = O(N2) and T = O˜(1). Goldstein et al. conjectured
that this is the best possible, more precisely that there is no data structure with S = N2−ε
and T = N1−ε for any constant ε > 0. Our first contribution is to disprove this conjecture
by showing a suite of algorithms with S3 · T = O˜(N6); for example, this achieves S =
O˜(N1.9) and T = O˜(N0.3).
New lower bounds: Demaine and Vadhan in 2001 showed that every 1-query algorithm for
3SUM-Indexing requires space Ω˜(N2). Our second result generalizes their bound to show
that for every space-S algorithm that makes T non-adaptive queries, S = Ω˜(N1+1/T ),
giving us non-trivial statements for T = o(logN). Any asymptotic improvement to our
result will result in a major breakthrough in static data structure lower bounds.
New cryptographic applications: “Backdoors” in cryptographic algorithms are a grave con-
cern, especially following recent revelations of weaknesses found in certain standardized
cryptographic primitives. A natural question is whether one can modify an entropic but
imperfect (unkeyed) function, which a powerful adversary may have tampered with, into
a function which is provably hard to invert even to such an adversary. That is, can we
use a “backdoored” random oracle to build secure cryptography? We provide a novel
formulation of this problem, modeling a random oracle whose truth table can be arbi-
trarily preprocessed by an unbounded adversary into an exponentially large lookup table
to which the online adversary has oracle access. We construct one-way functions in this
model assuming the hardness of a natural average-case variant of 3SUM-Indexing.
1 Introduction
One of the many equivalent formulations of the 3SUM problem is the following: given a set A of
N integers, output a1, a2, a3 ∈ A such that a1 + a2 = a3. There is an easy O(N2) time deter-
ministic algorithm for 3SUM. Conversely, the popular 3SUM conjecture states that there are no
sub-quadratic algorithms for this problem [GO95, Eri99].
Conjecture 1 (The “Modern 3SUM conjecture”). There is no algorithm for 3SUM running in
time O(N2−δ) for some constant δ > 0.
In this paper, we focus on a preprocessing variant of 3SUM known as 3SUM-Indexing, which
was first defined by Demaine and Vadhan [DV01] in an unpublished note and then by Goldstein,
Kopelowitz, Lewenstein and Porat [GKLP17]. In 3SUM-Indexing, there is an offline phase where
a computationally unbounded algorithm receives A = {a1, . . . , aN} and produces a data structure
with m words of w bits each; and an online phase which is given the target b and needs to find
a pair (a1, a2) such that a1 + a2 = b by probing only T memory cells of the data structure (i.e.,
taking “query time” T ). Note that the online phase does not receive the set A directly.
There are two simple algorithms that solve 3SUM-Indexing. The first stores a sorted version of A
as the data structure (so S = N) and in the online phase, solves 3SUM-Indexing in T = O(N) time
using the standard two-finger algorithm for 3SUM. The second stores all pairwise sums of A, sorted,
as the data structure (so S = O(N2)) and in the online phase, looks up the target b in T = O˜(1)
time.1 There were no other algorithms known prior to this work. This led [DV01, GKLP17] to
formulate the following three conjectures.
Conjecture 2 ([GKLP17]). If there exists an algorithm which solves 3SUM-Indexing with prepro-
cessing space S and T = O˜(1) probes then S = Ω˜(N2).
Conjecture 3 ([DV01]). If there exists an algorithm which solves 3SUM-Indexing with preprocessing
space S and T probes, then ST = Ω˜(N2).
Conjecture 4 ([GKLP17]). If there exists an algorithm which solves 3SUM-Indexing with T =
O˜(N1−δ) probes for some δ > 0 then S = Ω˜(N2).
Note that these conjectures are in ascending order of strength:
Conjecture 4 ⇒ Conjecture 3 ⇒ Conjecture 2.
In terms of lower bounds, Demaine and Vadhan [DV01] showed that any 1-probe data structure
for 3SUM-Indexing requires space S = Ω˜(N2). They leave the case of T > 1 open. Goldstein et
al. [GKLP17] established connections between Conjectures 2 and 4 and hardness of Set Disjointness,
Set Intersection, Histogram Indexing and Forbidden Pattern Document Retrieval.
1.1 Our contributions
Our contributions are three-fold. First, we show better algorithms for 3SUM-Indexing, refuting
Conjecture 4. Second, we improve the lower bound of [DV01] to arbitrary T ; our lower bound gives
a non-trivial space bound for T = o(logN) non-adaptive queries. As we argue later, any asymptotic
improvement to our lower bound will result in a major breakthrough in static data structure lower
bounds. Third and finally, we show how to use the conjectured hardness of 3SUM-Indexing to enable
a new cryptographic application, namely that of removing backdoors from unkeyed cryptographic
functions. Next, we give a brief overview of these results in turn.
1The notation O˜(f(N)) suppresses poly-logarithmic factors in f(N).
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1.1.1 Upper bound for 3SUM-Indexing
Theorem 1. For every 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, there is an adaptive data structure for 3SUM-Indexing with
space S = O˜(N2−δ) and query time T = O˜(N3δ).
In particular, Theorem 1 implies that by taking δ = 0.1, we get a data structure which solves
3SUM-Indexing in space S = O˜(N1.9) and T = O˜(N0.3) probes, and, thus, refutes Conjecture 4.
In a nutshell, the upper bound starts by considering the function f(i, j) = ai+aj. This function
has a domain of sizeN2 but a potentially much larger range. In a preprocessing step, we convert this
into a function g with a range of size O(N2) as well, such that inverting g lets us invert f . Once we
have such a function, we use a result of Fiat and Naor [FN00] who give a general space-time tradeoff
for inverting functions. This result gives non-trivial data structures for function inversion as long
as function evaluation can be done efficiently. Due to our definitions of the functions f and g, we
can efficiently compute them at every input, which leads to efficient inversion of f , and, therefore,
efficient solution to 3SUM-Indexing. For more details, see Section 4. We note that prior to this work
the result of Fiat and Naor [FN00] was recently used by Corrigan-Gibbs and Kogan [CGK18] for
other algorithmic and complexity applications. In a concurrent work, Kopelowitz and Porat [KP19]
obtain a similar upper bound for 3SUM-Indexing.
1.1.2 Lower bound for 3SUM-Indexing
We show that any algorithm for 3SUM-Indexing that uses a small number of probes requires large
space, as expressed formally in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For every non-adaptive algorithm that uses space S and query time T and solves
3SUM-Indexing, it holds that S = Ω˜(N1+1/T ).
The lower bound gives us meaningful (super-linear) space bounds for nearly logarithmic T .
Showing super-linear space bounds for static data structures for T = ω(logN) probes is a major
open question with significant implications [Sie04, Paˇt11, PTW10, Lar12, DGW19]. Essentially the
only known technique for proving super-linear space lower bounds for T = O(logN) is cell-sampling.
While the standard cell-sampling argument does not apply to the 3SUM-Indexing problem since this
problem does not have the expansion property under any distribution, we are able to recover the
corresponding lower bound for 3SUM-Indexing via a related method in the non-adaptive case.
In a nutshell, our lower bound proceeds by an incompressibility argument (introduced by Gen-
naro and Trevisan in [GT00], and later developed in [DTT10, DGK17]). That is, we show that
any data structure with “surprising” space-time behavior can be used to compress a random set
A ⊆ [N3] beyond its entropy. We refer the reader to Section 5 for more details on the proof.
1.1.3 Cryptographic application: “backdoored” random oracles
The power and prevalence of backdoors in cryptographic algorithms is a renewed concern given
recent revelations [CMG+16, CNE+14, Gre13]. We consider a new model of a random oracle
“backdoored” by a powerful adversary during a preprocessing phase.2
Recent results [Unr07, DGK17, CDGS18] studied the auxiliary-input random-oracle model in
which an attacker can compute arbitrary S bits of auxiliary information about the function table
of the random oracle H in a pre-processing phase, and make T additional queries to the random
oracle in an online phase (where, for example, the adversary receives y = H(x) that she wants to
2A random oracle H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is simply a uniformly random function to which all parties have oracle
access. We will let N = 2n throughout.
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invert). However, it is easy to see that such a result cannot be true when S ≥ n · 2n since the
preprocessed oracle can simply be the function table of the inverse function H−1. This allows an
adversary to invert H by making a single query to the S bits of preprocessed backdoor. In reality,
we do wish to capture the possibility that the backdoor is the inverse function, which puts us in a
conundrum.
A way out is to try to “immunize” the random oracle by designing a function g(z) = gH(z)
which we wish to show is one-way even against an adversary that has oracle access to the backdoor
for H. Let g : {0, 1}n′ → {0, 1}n′ . To prevent the inverse table attack above, we require at the
minimum that the size of the preprocessed table S is less than n′ · 2n′ .
This leads us to a natural static data structure problem with pre-processing. Imagine an
adversary that can preprocess the table of H into S bits. Our goal is to construct a function
g(z) = gH(z) (which necessarily acts on more than log S bits) which is one-way against an adversary
who can make T = poly(n) queries to the S bits of preprocessed random oracle. Assuming the
hardness of 3SUM with preprocessing for T = poly(n) = poly(logN) and space S, we show precisely
such an immunization strategy. We refer the reader to Section 6 for more details on the construction.
We note the recent work of [BFM18] which circumvents the inverse table barrier in a different
way, by assuming the existence of at least two independent (backdoored) random oracles. This
allows them to use techniques from two-source extraction and communication complexity to come
up with an immunization strategy.
2 Related work
2.1 Preprocessing attacks in cryptography
The power and limitation of preprocessing attacks have been studied in several contexts of cryp-
tography, including time-space tradeoffs, non-uniform security and immunizing backdoors.
Time-space tradeoffs Hellman studied time-space tradeoffs for inverting random functions in
his seminal paper [Hel80]. He showed that a random n-to-n bit function can be inverted with 22n/3
online time and precomputed information. A series of followup works [FN00, BBS06, DTT10]
studied time-space tradeoffs for inverting arbitrary one-way permutations, one-way functions and
pseudorandom generators. In particular, Fiat and Naor [FN00] showed a 23n/4 tradeoff for inverting
any n-to-n bit function on every point.
Random oracles and non-uniform security Motivated by assessing the non-uniform security
of hash functions, recent works [Unr07, DGK17, CDGS18] studied the auxiliary-input random-
oracle model in which an attacker can compute arbitrary S bits of leakage before attacking the
system and make T additional queries to the random oracle. Although our model is similar in that
it allows preprocessed leakage of a random oracle, we differ significantly in two ways: the size of
the leakage is larger, and the attacker only has oracle access to the leakage.
Specifically, their results and technical tools only apply to the setting where the leakage is
smaller than the value table of the random oracle, whereas our model deals with leakage that
is allowed to be larger. Furthermore, the random oracle model with auxiliary input allows the
online adversary to access and depend on the leakage in an arbitrary way while our model only
allows bounded number of oracle queries to the leakage, which is a more realistic model for online
adversaries with bounded time and which cannot read the entire leakage at query time.
4
Immunizing backdoors and kleptography Motivated by immunizing backdoors, a series of
recent works [DGG+15, BFM18, RTYZ18, FJM18] studied backdoored primitives including pseu-
dorandom generators and hash functions. In this setting, the attacker might be given some space-
bounded backdoor about a primitive, which could allow him to break the system more easily.
In particular, backdoored hash functions and random oracles are studied in [BFM18, FJM18].
Both of them observe that immunizing against a backdoor for a single unkeyed hash function might
be hard. For this reason, [BFM18] considers the problem of combining two random oracles (with
two independent backdoors). Instead, we look at the case of a single random oracle but add a
restriction on the size of the advice. [FJM18] considers the setting of keyed functions such as
(weak) pseudorandom functions, which are easier to immunize than unkeyed functions of the type
we consider in this work.
The study of backdoored primitives is also related to — and sometimes falls within the field
of — kleptography, originally introduced by Young and Yung [YY97, YY96b, YY96a]. A klepto-
graphic attack “uses cryptography against cryptography” [YY97], by changing the behavior of a
cryptographic system in a fashion undetectable to an honest user with black-box access to the cryp-
tosystem, such that the use of the modified system leaks some secret information (e.g., plaintexts
or key material) to the attacker who performed the modification. An example of such an attack
might be to modify the key generation algorithm of an encryption scheme such that an adversary
in possession of a “back door” can derive the private key from the public key, yet an honest user
finds the generated key pairs to be indistinguishable from correctly produced ones.
2.2 3SUM
The field of fine-grained complexity leverages algorithmic hardness assumptions to prove quanti-
tative lower bounds for wide classes of problems. The standard assumptions in this field (Vas-
silevska Williams [VW15, VW18] gives excellent surveys of this topic) are hardness of CNF-
SAT [IP01, IPZ01], 3SUM [GO95, Eri99], Orthogonal Vectors (OV) [Wil05], All Pairs Shortest
Paths (APSP) [WW10], and Online Matrix-Vector Multiplication (OMV) [HKNS15].
Implications of the 3SUM Conjecture The 3SUM conjecture (Conjecture 1) has been helpful
for understanding the precise hardness of many geometric problems [GO95, dBdGO97, BVKT98,
ACH+98, Eri99, BHP01, AHI+01, SEO03, AEK05, EHPM06, CEHP07, AHP08, AAD+12]. Start-
ing with the works of Vassilevska and Williams [VW09], and Paˇtras¸cu [Paˇt10], the 3SUM conjecture
has also been used for conditional lower bounds for many combinatorial [AVW14, GKLP16, KPP16]
and string search [CHC09, BCC+13, AVWW14, ACLL14, AKL+16, KPP16] problems.
Algorithms for 3SUM The two standard algorithms for 3SUM on N integers from a range of
size U run in time O(N2) and O(N + U logU) [CLRS09] (Exercise 30.1-7). The most efficient
algorithm for this problem, due to Baran et al. [BDP08], runs in time O(N2(log logN)2/ log2N).
Kane et al. [KLM18] prove almost tight bounds on the linear decision tree complexity of 3SUM.
Wang and Lincoln et al. [Wan14, LVWWW16] show that 3SUM algorithms can be implemented in
space O˜(
√
N). Also, Carmosino et al. [CGI+16] give a co-non-deterministic algorithm for 3SUM
running in time O˜(N3/2), which shows that proving SETH-hardness of 3SUM is out of reach of the
current techniques.
The “Real 3SUM” problem, where the input numbers are reals rather than integers, has also
attracted a lot of attention. Starting with the breakthrough work of Grønlund and Pettie [GP14],
the algorithms (in the Real-RAM model) for this version of 3SUM [Fre17, Cha18] achieved running
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time O(N2(log logN)O(1)/ log2N), which essentially matches the running time of the algorithms
for Integer 3SUM.
Data-structure versions of the conjecture While the standard conjectures about the hard-
ness of CNF-SAT, 3SUM, OV and APSP concern algorithms, the OMV conjecture claims a data
structure lower bound for the Matrix-Vector Multiplication problem. While algorithmic conjectures
help to understand time complexity of the problems, it is also natural to consider data structure
analogues of the fine-grained conjectures in order to understand space complexity of the corre-
sponding problems. Recently Goldstein et al. [GKLP17, GLP17] proposed data structure variants
of many classical hardness assumptions (including 3SUM and OV). Other data structure variants
of the 3SUM problem have also been studied in [DV01, BW09, CL15, CCI+19]. In particular, Chan
and Lewenstein [CL15] use techniques from additive combinatorics to give efficient data structures
for solving 3SUM on subsets of the preprocessed sets.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
When an uppercase letter represents an integer, we use the convention that the associated lowercase
letter represents its base-2 logarithm: N = 2n, S = 2s, etc. [N ] denotes the set {1, . . . , N} that
we identify with {0, 1}n. x‖y denotes the concatenation of bit strings x and y. PPT stands for
probabilistic polynomial time.
3.2 3SUM-Indexing
In this paper, we focus on the variant of 3SUM known as 3SUM-Indexing, formally defined in
[GKLP17], which can be thought of as a preprocessing variant of 3SUM. Our definition is a gener-
alization of [GKLP17], where we allow the input to be elements of an arbitrary abelian3 group.
Definition 3. The problem 3SUM-Indexing(G,N), parametrized by an abelian group G and an
integer N , is defined to be solved by a two-part algorithm A = (A1,A2) as follows.
• Preprocessing phase. A1 receives as input a tuple A = (a1, . . . , aN ) of N elements from G
and outputs a data structure DA of size
4 at most S. A1 is computationally unbounded.
• Query phase. Denote by A + A the set of pairwise sums of elements from A: A + A =
{ai + aj : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N}. Given an arbitrary query b ∈ A+ A, A2 makes at most T oracle
queries to DA and must output (i, j) ∈ [N ]2 with i 6= j such that ai + aj = b.5
We say that A is an (S, T ) algorithm for 3SUM-Indexing(G,N). Furthermore, we say that A is
non-adaptive if the T queries made by A2 are non-adaptive (i.e., the indices of the queried cells
are only a function of b).
A few remarks about Definition 3 are in order.
3This is for convenience and because our applications only involve abelian groups; our results and techniques easily
generalize to the non-abelian case.
4The model of computation in this paper is the word RAM model where we assume that the word length is
Θ(logN). Furthermore we assume that words are large enough to contain description of elements of G, i.e., |G| ≤ Nc
for some c > 0. The size of a data structure is the number of words (or cells) it contains.
5Without loss of generality, we can assume that DA contains a copy of S and in this case A2 could return a pair
(ai, aj) at the cost of two additional queries.
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Remark 1. An alternative definition would have the query b be an arbitrary element of G (instead
of being restricted to A+A) and A2 return the special symbol ⊥ when b ∈ G \ (A+A). Again, an
algorithm A for the problem as defined in Definition 3—with undefined behavior for b ∈ G\(A+A)—
can be turned into an algorithm for this seemingly more general problem at the cost of two extra
queries: given output (i, j) on query b, return (i, j) if ai + aj = b and return ⊥ otherwise.
Remark 2. The requirement that i 6= j for A2’s output is without loss of generality for integers,
but prevents the occurrence of degenerate cases in some groups. For example, if G is such that
all elements are of order 2 (e.g., (Z/2Z)cn) then finding (i, j) such that ai + aj = 0 has the trivial
solution i = j for any i ∈ [N ].
Remark 3. In order to preprocess the elements of some group G, we assume an efficient way to
enumerate its elements. More specificially, we assume a time- and space-efficient algorithm for
evaluating an injective function Index : G → [N c] for a constant c. For simplicity, we also assume
that the word length is at least c logN so that we can store Index(g) for every g ∈ G in a memory
cell. For example, for the standard 3SUM-Indexing problem over the integers from 0 to N c, one
can consider the group G = (Z/kZ,+) for k = 2N c + 1, and the trivial function Index(ak) = a for
0 ≤ a < k. For ease of exposition, we abuse notation and write g instead of Index(g) for an element
of the group g ∈ G. For example, g mod p for an integer p will always mean Index(g) mod p.
The standard 3SUM-Indexing problem (formally introduced in [GKLP17]) corresponds to the
case where G = (Z,+). In fact, it is usually assumed that the integers are upper-bounded by some
polynomial in N , which is easily shown to be equivalent to the case where G = (Z/N cZ,+) for
some c > 0, and is sometimes referred to as modular 3SUM when there is no preprocessing.
Another important special case is when G =
(
(Z/2Z)cn,+
)
for some c > 0. In this case, G can
be thought of as the group of binary strings of length cn where the group operation is the bitwise
XOR (exclusive or). This problem is usually referred to as 3XOR when there is no preprocessing,
and we refer to its preprocessing variant as 3XOR-Indexing. In [JV16], the authors provide some
evidence that the hardnesses of 3XOR and 3SUM are related and conjecture that Conjecture 1
generalizes to 3XOR. We similarly conjecture that in the presence of preprocessing, Conjecture 3
generalizes to 3XOR-Indexing.
Following Definition 3, the results and techniques in this paper hold for arbitrary abelian groups
and thus provide a unified treatment of the 3SUM-Indexing and 3XOR-Indexing problems. It is an
interesting open question for future research to better understand the influence of the group G on
the hardness of the problem.
Open Question 1. For which groups is 3SUM-Indexing significantly easier to solve, and for which
groups does Conjecture 3 not hold?
3.2.1 Average-case hardness
This paper moreover introduces a new average-case variant of 3SUM-Indexing (Definition 4 below)
that, to the authors’ knowledge, has not been stated in prior literature.6 Definition 4 states an error
parameter ε, as for the cryptographic applications it is useful to consider solvers for average-case
3SUM-Indexing that only output correct answers with probability ε < 1.
Definition 4. The average-case 3SUM-Indexing(G,N) problem, parametrized by an abelian group
G and integer N , is defined to be solved by a two-part algorithm A = (A1,A2) as follows.
6We remark that for the classical version of 3SUM, the uniform random distribution of the inputs is believed to
be the hardest (see, e.g., [KPP16]).
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• Preprocessing phase. Let A be a tuple of N elements from G drawn uniformly at random
and with replacement. A1(A) outputs a data structure DA of size at most S. A1 has
unbounded computational power.
• Query phase. Given a query b drawn uniformly at random in A + A, and given up to T
oracle queries to DA, A2(b) outputs (i, j) ∈ [N ]2 with i 6= j such that ai + aj = b.
We say that A = (A1,A2) is an (S, T, ε) solver for 3SUM-Indexing if it answers the query
correctly with probability ε over the randomness of A, A, and the random query b. When ε = 1,
we leave it implicit and write simply (S, T ).
Remark 4. Note that in the query phase of Definition 4, the query b is chosen uniformly at random
in A+A and not in G. As observed in Remark 1, this is without loss of generality for ε = 1. When
ε < 1, the meaningful way to measure the success probability of A is as in Definition 4 since A+A
could have negligible density in G and A could succeed with overwhelming probability by always
outputting ⊥.
4 Upper bound
We will use the following data structure first suggested by Hellman [Hel80] and then rigorously
studied by Fiat and Naor [FN00].
Theorem 5 ([FN00]). For any function F : D → D, and for any choice of values S and T such
that S3T ≥ |D|3, there is a deterministic data structure with space O˜(S) which allows inverting F
at every point making O˜(T ) queries to the memory cells and evaluations of F . 7
The idea of our upper bound is the following. Since we are only interested in the pairwise sums
of the N input elements a1, . . . , aN ∈ G, we can hash down their sums to a set of size O(N2). Now
we define the function f(i, j) = ai + aj for i, j ∈ [N ], and note that its domain and range are both
of size O(N2). We apply the generic inversion algorithm of Fiat and Naor to f with |D| = O(N2),
and obtain a data structure for 3SUM-Indexing.
First, in Lemma 6 we give an efficient data structure for the “modular” version of
3SUM-Indexing(G,N) where for an integer p = O˜(N2) and N inputs a1, . . . , aN ∈ G, each query
b ∈ G asks to find i, j ∈ [N ] such that ai + aj ≡ b mod p.8 Then, in Theorem 7 we reduce the
general case of 3SUM-Indexing(G,N) to the modular one.
Lemma 6. For every 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and every integer p = O˜(N2), there is an adaptive data
structure which uses space S = O˜(N2−δ) and query time T = O˜(N3δ) and solves modular
3SUM-Indexing(G,N): for input a1, . . . , aN ∈ G and a query b ∈ G, it outputs ai, aj such that
ai + aj ≡ b mod p, if such ai and aj exist.
Proof. Let the N input elements be a1, . . . , aN ∈ G. The data structure will store all ai (this
takes only N memory cells) along with the information needed to efficiently invert the function
f : [N ]× [N ]→ G defined below. For i, j ∈ G, let f(i, j) = ai + aj mod p. Note that:
1. f is easy to compute. Indeed, given the input, one can compute f by looking at only two
input elements.
7While the result in Theorem 1.1 in [FN00] is stated for a randomized preprocessing procedure, we remark that
a less efficient deterministic procedure which brute forces the probability space can be used instead.
8Recall from Remark 3 that this notation actually means Index(ai + aj) ≡ Index(b) mod p.
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2. The domain of f is of size N2, and the range of f is of size p = O˜(N2).
3. Inverting f at a point b ∈ G allows one to check whether there exists ai and aj such that
ai + aj ≡ b mod p, which essentially solves the modular 3SUM-Indexing(G,N) problem.
Now we use the data structure from Theorem 5 with |D| = O˜(N2) to invert f . This gives us a
data structure with space O˜(S +N) = O˜(S) and query time O˜(T ) for every S3T ≥ |D|3 = O˜(N6),
which finishes the proof.
It remains to show that the input of 3SUM-Indexing can always be hashed to a set of integers
[D] for some D = O˜(N2). While many standard hashing functions will work here, we remark that
it is important for our applciation that the hash function of choice has a time- and space-efficient
implementation (for example, the data structure in [FN00] requires non-trivial implementations of
hash functions). Below we present a simple hashing procedure which suffices for 3SUM-Indexing,
but a more general reduction can be found in Lemma 17 in [CGK18].
Theorem 7. For every 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, there is an adaptive data structure for 3SUM-Indexing(G,N)
with space S = O˜(N2−δ) and query time T = O˜(N3δ).
In particular, by taking δ = 0.1, we get a data structure which solves 3SUM-Indexing in space
S = O˜(N1.9) and query time T = O˜(N0.3), and, thus, refutes Conjecture 4.
Proof. Let the N inputs be a1, . . . , aN ∈ G. Let Z ⊆ [N c], |Z| < N2 be the set of pairwise sums of
the inputs:
Z := {ai + aj : 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N} .
Let I = {N2, . . . , 5cN2 logN} be an interval of integers. By the prime number theorem, for large
enough N , I contains at least 4cN2 primes. Let us pick m = logN random primes p1, . . . , pm from
I. For two distinct numbers z1, z2 ∈ Z, we say that they have a collision modulo p if p divides
z1 − z2.
Let g ∈ G be a positive query of 3SUM-Indexing(G,N), that is, b = Index(g) ∈ Z. First, we
show that with high probability (over the choices of m random primes) there exists an i ∈ [m] such
that for every z ∈ Z, z 6= b, b and z do not collide modulo pi. Indeed, for every z ∈ Z, z 6= b, we
have that (z − b) has at most c/2 prime factors from I. Since |Z| < N2, at most cN2/2 primes
from I divide (z − b) for any z ∈ Z. Therefore, a random prime from I gives a collision for b
and some z with probability at most 1/8. Now we have that for every b ∈ Z, the probability that
there exists an i ∈ [m] such that b does not collide with any z ∈ Z, z 6= b modulo pi, is at least
1 − (1/8)m = 1 − N−3. Therefore, with high probability, a random set of m primes works for all
b ∈ Z: for every b there exists an i ∈ [m] such that b does not collide with any z ∈ Z, z 6= b modulo
pi. Since such a set of m primes exists, the preprocessing stage of the data structure can find it
deterministically.
Now we construct m = logN modular 3SUM-Indexing(G,N) data structures (one for each pi),
and separately solve the problem for each of the m primes. This results in a data structure as
guaranteed by Lemma 6 with a logN overhead in space and time. The data structure also stores
the inputs a1, . . . , aN . Once it sees a solution modulo pi, it checks whether it corresponds to a
solution to the original problem. Now correctness follows from two observations. Since the data
structure checks whether a solution modulo pi gives a solution to the original problem, the data
structure never reports false positives. Second, the above observation that for every b ∈ Z there is
a prime pi such that b does not collide with other z ∈ Z, a solution modulo pi will correspond to a
solution of the original problem (thus, no false negatives can be reported either).
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Remark 5. A few extensions of Theorem 7 are in order.
1. The result of Fiat and Naor [FN00] also gives an efficient randomized data structure. Namely,
there is a randomized data structure with preprocessing running time O˜(|D|), which allows
inverting F at every point with probability at least 1 − 1/|D| over the randomness of the
preprocessing stage. Thus, the preprocessing phase of the randomized version of Theorem 5
runs in quasilinear time O˜(|D|) = O˜(N2) (since sampling m = logN random primes from a
given interval can also be done in randomized time O˜(1)). This, in particular, implies that
the preprocessing time of the presented data structure for 3SUM-Indexing is optimal under the
3-SUM Conjecture (Conjecture 1). Indeed, if the preprocessing time was improved to N2−ε,
then one could solve 3-SUM by querying the N input numbers in (randomized or expected)
time N2−ε.
2. We remark that for polynomially small ε = 1/|D|α (for constant α), the trade-off between
S and T can be further improved for the ε-approximate solution of 3SUM-Indexing, using
approximate function inversion by De et al. [DTT10].
We showed how to refute the strong 3SUM-Indexing conjecture of [GKLP17] using techniques
from space-time tradeoffs for function inversion [Hel80, FN00], specifically the general function
inversion algorithm of Fiat and Naor [FN00]. A natural open question is whether a more specific
function inversion algorithm could be designed:
Open Question 2. Can the space-time trade-off achived in Theorem 7 be improved by exploiting
the specific structure of the 3SUM-Indexing problem?
5 Lower bound
We now present our lower bound: we prove a space-time trade-off of S = Ω˜(N1+1/T ) for any
non-adaptive (S, T ) algorithm. While it is weaker than Conjecture 3, any improvement on this
result would break a long-standing barrier in static data structure lower bounds: no bounds better
than T ≥ Ω( logNlog(S/N)) are known, even for non-adaptive cell-probe and linear models [Sie04, Paˇt11,
PTW10, Lar12, DGW19].
Our proof relies on a compressibility argument similar to [GT00, DTT10] also known as cell-
sampling in the data structure literature [PTW10]. Roughly speaking, we show that given an
(S, T ) algorithm (A1,A2), we can recover a subset of the input A by storing a randomly sampled
subset V of the preprocessed data structure DA and simulating A2 on all possible queries: the
simulation succeeds whenever the queries made by A2 fall inside V . Thus, by storing V along with
the remaining part of the input, we obtain an encoding of the entire input. This implies that the
length of the encoding must be at least the entropy of a randomly chosen input.
Theorem 8. Let N ≥ 2 be an integer and G be an abelian group with |G| ≥ N2, then any non-
adaptive (S, T ) algorithm for 3SUM-Indexing(G,N) satisfies: S = Ω˜(N1+1/T ).
Proof. Consider an (S, T ) algorithm A = (A1,A2) for 3SUM-Indexing(G,N). We want to use A to
design encoding and decoding procedures for inputs of 3SUM-Indexing(G,N). For this, we will first
sample a subset V of the data structure cells which allows us to answer many queries. Using this
set, we will argue that we can recover a constant fraction of the input, which will lead to a succinct
encoding of the input.
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Sampling a subset V of cells. For a query b ∈ G, Q(b) ⊆ [S] denotes the set of probes made
by A2 on input b (with |Q(b)| ≤ T , since A2 makes at most T probes to the data structure). Given
a subset V ⊆ [S] of cells, we denote by GV the set of queries in G which can be answered by A2 by
only making probes within V : GV = {b ∈ G : Q(b) ⊆ V }. Observe that for a uniformly random
set V of size v:
E
[|GV |] =∑
b∈G
Pr[Q(b) ⊆ V ] ≥ |G|
(S−T
v−T
)(S
v
) = |G| T−1∏
i=0
v − i
S − i ≥ |G|
(
v − T
S − T
)T
,
where the last inequality uses that a/b ≥ (a− 1)/(b − 1) for a ≤ b. Hence, there exists a subset V
of size v, such that:
|GV | ≥ |G|
(
v − T
S − T
)T
,
and we will henceforth consider such a set V . The size v of V will be set later so that |GV | ≥ |G|/N .
Using V to recover the input. Consider some inputA = (a1, . . . , aN ) for 3SUM-Indexing(G,N).
We say that i ∈ [N ] is good if ai is output by A2 given some query in GV . Since queries in GV can
be answered by only storing the subset of cells of the data structure indexed by V , our decoding
procedure will retrieve from these cells all the good elements from A. Note that i ∈ [N ] is good if:
∃j ∈ [N ] \ {i}, (ai + aj ∈ GV ) ∧
(∀k ∈ [N ] \ {i},∀ℓ ∈ [N ] \ {i, k}, ak + aℓ 6= ai + aj) . (1)
Indeed, observe that:
1. The first part of the conjunction guarantees that there exists b ∈ GV which can be decomposed
as b = ai + aj for j 6= i.
2. The second part of the conjunction guarantees that the decomposition b = ai + aj is unique,
i.e. that there is no other pair of elements of A which adds up to b.
By correctness of A, A2 outputs a decomposition of its input as a sum of two elements in A if one
exists. For j as in (1), the decomposition b = ai + aj is unique and hence A2(ai + aj) = (ai, aj).
We denote by NV ⊆ [N ] the set of good indices, and compute its expected size when A is
chosen at random according to the distribution in Definition 4, i.e. for each i ∈ [N ], ai is chosen
independently and uniformly in G.
E
[|NV |] ≥ N∑
i=1
Pr[∃j 6= i, ai + aj ∈ GV ] Pr[∀k, ℓ 6= i, ak + aℓ 6= ai + aj | ai + aj ∈ GV ] (2)
Note that:
Pr[∃j 6= i, ai + aj ∈ GV ] = 1− Pr[∀j 6= i, ai + aj /∈ GV ] = 1−
(
1− |GV ||G|
)N−1
,
where the second equality is because for j 6= i, aj needs to be distinct from the |GV | elements
−ai + g for g ∈ GV . Furthermore:
Pr[∀k, ℓ 6= i, ak + aℓ 6= ai + aj | ai + aj ∈ GV ] = 1− Pr[∃k, ℓ 6= i, ak + aℓ = ai + aj | ai + aj ∈ GV ]
≥ 1−
∑
k,ℓ 6=i
Pr[ak + aℓ = ai + aj | ai + aj ∈ GV ]
≥ 1− (N − 1)(N − 2)
2
1
|G| ≥
1
2
,
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where the first inequality uses the union bound and the last inequality uses that |G| ≥ N2. Using
the previous two derivations in (2), we get:
E
[|NV |] ≥ N
2
(
1−
(
1− |GV ||G|
)N−1)
≥ N
4
, (3)
where the last inequality uses that |GV | ≥ |G|/N and that (1− 1/N)N−1 ≤ 1/2 for N ≥ 2.
Encoding and decoding. It follows from (3) and a simple averaging argument that with prob-
ability at least 1/16 over the random choice of A, NV is of size at least N/5. We will henceforth
focus on providing encoding and decoding procedures for such inputs A. Specifically, consider the
following pair of encoding/decoding algorithms for A:
• Enc(A): given input A = (a1, . . . , aN ).
1. use A2 to compute the set NV ⊆ [N ] of good indices.
2. store
(A1(A)j)j∈V and (ai)i/∈NV .
• Dec(Enc(A)): for each b ∈ G, simulate A2 on input b:
1. If Q(b) ⊆ V , use (A1(A)i)i∈V (which was stored in Enc(A)) to simulate A2 and getA2(b). By definition of NV , when b ranges over the queries such that Q(b) ⊆ V , this
step recovers (ai)i∈NV .
2. Then recover (ai)i/∈Nv directly from Enc(A).
Note that the bit length of the encoding is:
|Enc(A)| ≤ v · w + (N − |NV |) log |G| ≤ v · w + 4N
5
log |G|
where w is the word length and where the second inequality holds because we restrict ourselves to
inputs A such that |NV | ≥ N/5. By a standard incompressibility argument (see for example Fact
8.1 in [DTT10]), since our encoding and decoding succeeds with probability at least 1/16 over the
random choice of A, we need to be able to encode at least |G|N/16 distinct values, hence:
v · w + 4N
5
log |G| ≥ N log |G|+O(1) (4)
Finally, as discussed before, we set v such that |GV |/|G| ≥ 1/N . For this, by the computation
performed at the beginning of this proof, it is sufficient to have:(
v − T
S − T
)T
≥ 1
N
.
Hence, we set v = T + (S − T )/N1/T and since T ≤ N ≤ S (otherwise the result is trivial), (4)
implies:
S = Ω˜(N1+1/T )
Remark 6. 3SUM-Indexing(Z/N cZ, N) reduces to 3SUM-Indexing over the integers, so our lower
bound extends to 3SUM-Indexing(Z, N), too. Specifically, the reduction works as follows: we
choose {0¯, . . . , N c − 1} as the set of representatives of Z/N cZ. Given some input A ⊆ Z/N cZ
for 3SUM-Indexing(Z/N cZ, N), we treat it as a list of integers and build a data structure using our
algorithm for 3SUM-Indexing(Z, N). Now, given a query b¯ ∈ Z/N cZ, we again treat it as an integer
and query the data structure at b and b + N c. The correctness of the reduction follows from the
observation that b¯ = a¯i + a¯j if and only if ai + aj = b or ai + aj = b+N
c.
12
As we already mentioned, no lower bound better than T ≥ Ω( logNlog(S/N)) is known even for non-
adaptive cell-probe and linear models, so Theorem 8 matches the best known lower bounds for static
data structures. An ambitious goal for future research would naturally be to prove Conjecture 3.
A first step in this direction would be to extend Theorem 8 to adaptive strategies that potentially
err with some probability.
Open Question 3. Must any (possibly adaptive) (S, T, ε) algorithm for 3SUM-Indexing(G,N)
require S = Ω˜(εN1+1/T )?
6 Application to cryptography
6.1 Background on random oracles and preprocessing
A line of work initiated by [IR89] studies the hardness of a random oracle as a one way function. In
[IR89] it was shown that a random oracle is an exponentially hard one-way function against uniform
adversaries. The case of non-uniform adversaries was later studied in [Imp96, Zim98]. Specifically
we have the following result.
Proposition 9 ([Zim98]). With probability at least 1 − 1N over the choice of a random oracle
R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, for all oracle circuits C of size at most T :
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[
CR
(
R(x)
) ∈ R−1(R(x))] ∈ O˜(T 2
N
)
.
In Proposition 9, the choice of the circuit occurs after the random draw of the oracle: in other
words, the description of the circuit can be seen as a non-uniform advice which depends on the
random oracle. Proposition 10 is a slight generalization where the adversary is a uniform Turing
machine independent of the random oracle, with oracle access to an advice of length at most S
depending on the random oracle. While the two formulations are equivalent in the regime S ≤ T ,
one advantage of this reformulation is that S can be larger than the running time T of the adversary.
Proposition 10 (Implicit in [DTT10]). Let A be a uniform oracle Turing machine whose number
of oracle queries is T : {0, 1}n → N. For all n ∈ N and S ∈ N, with probability at least 1− 1N over
the choice of a random oracle R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n:
∀P ∈ {0, 1}S , Pr
x←{0,1}n
[
AR,P (R(x)) ∈ R−1(R(x))] ∈ O(T (S + n)
N
)
.
In Proposition 10, the advice P can be thought of as the result of a preprocessing phase involving
the random oracle. Also, no assumption is made on the computational power of the preprocessing
adversary but it is simply assumed that the length of the advice is bounded.
Remark 7. Propositions 9 and 10 assume a deterministic adversary. For the regime of S > T (which
is the focus of this work), this assumption is without loss of generality since a standard averaging
argument shows that for a randomized adversary, there exist a choice of “good” randomness for
which the adversary achieves at least its expected success probability. This choice of randomness
can be hard-coded in the non-uniform advice, yielding a deterministic adversary.
Note, however, that Proposition 10 provides no guarantee when S ≥ N . In fact, in this case,
defining P to be any inverse mapping R−1 of R allows an adversary to invert R with probability
one by making a single query to P . So, R itself can no longer be used as a one-way function when
S ≥ N — but one can still hope to use R to define a new function fR that is one-way against an
adversary with advice of size S ≥ N . This idea motivates the following definition.
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Definition 11. Let R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a random oracle. A one-way function in the random
oracle model with S preprocessing is an efficiently computable oracle function fR : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n′
such that for any two-part adversary A = (A1,A2) satisfying |A1(·)| ≤ S and where A2 is PPT,
the following probability is negligible in n:9
Pr
R,x←{0,1}n
[
fR
(
AR,A1(R)2
(
fR(x)
))
= fR(x)
]
.
The adversary model in Definition 11 is almost identical to the 1-BRO model of [BFM18], dif-
fering only in having a restriction on the output size of A1. As was noted in [BFM18], without
this restriction (and in fact, as soon as S ≥ 2n′ by the same argument as above), no function fR
can achieve the property given in Definition 11. [BFM18] bypasses this impossibility by consider-
ing the restricted case of two independent oracles with two independent preprocessed advices (of
unrestricted sizes). Our work bypasses it in a different and incomparable way, by considering the
case of a single random oracle with bounded advice.
6.2 Candidate construction
Our main candidate construction of a OWF (Construction 13) relies on the hardness of average-case
3SUM-Indexing. First, we define what hardness means, then give the constructions and proofs.
Definition 12. Average-case 3SUM-Indexing is (G,N, S, T, ε)-hard if the success probability10 of
any (S, T ) algorithm A = (A1,A2) in answering average-case 3SUM-Indexing(G,N) queries is at
most ε.
Construction 13. Let N be an integer and G be an abelian group with |G| ≥ N and let R :
[N ]→ G be a random oracle.
Our candidate OWF construction has two components:
• the function fR : [N ]× [N ]→ G defined as follows, where + denotes G’s operation:
fR(i, j) = R(i) +R(j), (i, j) ∈ [N ]2 .
• the input distribution (I, J) where I is uniformly random in [N ] and J is uniformly random
in [N ] \ {I}.
Remark 8 (Approximate sampling). For convenience, our candidate OWF is defined with respect to
an input distribution which is not uniform over the domain of fR. While this may seem restrictive,
as long as the input distribution is efficiently samplable, a standard construction shows how to
transform a one way function of this type into a one-way function which operates on uniformly
random bit strings (see [Gol01, Section 2.4.2]).
In our case, since N(N − 1) is not a power of two (for N > 2), the input distribution (I, J) in
Construction 13 cannot be sampled exactly in time polynomial in logN . However, using rejection
sampling, it is easy to construct a sampler taking as input ⌈logN⌉2 random bits and whose output
distribution is 1/N close to (I, J) in statistical distance. It is easy to propagate this (negligibly)
small sampling error without affecting the conclusion of Theorem 14.
This is similar to what happens when considering one way functions based on the hardness of
factoring which require sampling integers in a range whose length is not necessarily a power of two.
9A negligible function is one that is in o(n−c) for all constants c.
10Over the randomness of A, A, and the average-case 3SUM-Indexing query. (Recall: A is 3SUM-Indexing’s input.)
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Remark 9. Similarly, the random oracle R used in the construction is not a random oracle in the
traditional sense since its domain and co-domain are not bit strings. If |G| and N are powers of
two, then R can be implemented exactly by a standard random oracle {0, 1}logN → {0, 1}log |G|.
If not, using a random oracle {0, 1}poly(⌈log |G|⌉) → {0, 1}poly(⌈log |G|⌉), and rejection sampling, it is
possible to implement an oracle R′ which is 1/N close to R in statistical distance. We can similarly
propagate this 1/N sampling error without affecting the conclusion of Theorem 14.
Theorem 14. Consider a sequence of abelian groups (GN )N≥1 such that |GN | ≥ N2+c for some
c > 0 and all N ≥ 1, and a function S : N → R. Assume that for all polynomial T there exists
a negligible function ε such that average-case 3SUM-Indexing is (GN , N, S(n), T (n), ε(n)) hard for
all N ≥ 1 (recall that n = logN). Then the function f defined in Construction 13 is a one-way
function in the random oracle model with S preprocessing.
The function fR in Construction 13 is designed precisely so that inverting fR is equivalent
to solving 3SUM-Indexing for the input A = (R(1), . . . , R(N)). However, the one-way function
inversion game and average-case 3SUM-Indexing are not exactly identical. Indeed, in the one-
way function inversion game, the input to the adversary is the random variable fR(I, J) which is
distributed as AI + AJ for a uniformly random set of indices {I, J}. In contrast, in average-case
3SUM-Indexing, the input to the adversary is uniform over A + A. These two input distributions
are not identical if there are collisions: pairs of sets {i, j}, {k, l} such that Ai + Aj = Ak + Al.
The following two lemmas show that whenever |G| ≥ N2+c for some c > 0, there are sufficiently
few collisions that the two input distributions are negligibly close in statistical distance, which is
sufficient to prove Theorem 14.
Lemma 15. Let N ≥ 2 be an integer and let G be an abelian group with |G| ≥ N2+c for some
c > 0. Let A = (A1, . . . , AN ) be a tuple of N elements drawn with replacement from G. Define the
following two random variables:
• X1 = AI +AJ where {I, J} ⊆ [N ] is a uniformly random set of size 2.
• X2: uniformly random in A+A = {Ai +Aj : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N}.
Then the statistical distance ‖(A,X1)− (A,X2)‖s = O
(
1/
√
N c
)
.
Proof. First, by conditioning on the realization of A:
‖(A,X1)− (A,X2)‖s =
∑
a∈GN
Pr[A = a]‖X1|a −X2|a‖s , (5)
where Xi|a denotes the distribution of Xi conditioned on the event A = a for i ∈ {1, 2}.
We now focus on a single term, corresponding to the realization A = a and define the set of
pairwise sums D = {ai + aj : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N}, and for g ∈ G, cg =
∣∣{{i, j} ⊆ [N ]2 : ai + aj = g}∣∣
is the number of pairs whose sum is g. Then we have:
‖X1|a −X2|a‖s =
1
2
∑
g∈D
∣∣∣∣∣ 1|D| − cg(N
2
)∣∣∣∣∣ .
Observe that cg ≥ 1 whenever g ∈ D. We now assume that |D| ≥ 12
(N
2
)
(we will later only use the
following derivation under this assumption). Splitting the sum on cg > 1:
‖X1|a −X2|a‖s =
1
2
∑
g : cg=1
(
1
|D| −
1(N
2
))+ 1
2
∑
g : cg>1
(
cg(N
2
) − 1|D|
)
,
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where we used the trivial upper bound |D| ≤ (N2 ) and the assumption that |D| ≥ 12(N2 ) to determine
the sign of the quantity inside the absolute value. We then write:
‖X1|a −X2|a‖s =
1
2
∑
g : cg=1
(
1
|D| −
1(N
2
))+ 1
2
∑
g : cg>1
(
cg − 1(N
2
) + 1(N
2
) − 1|D|
)
≤ 1
2
∑
g : cg≥1
(
1
|D| −
1(
N
2
))+ 1
2
∑
g : cg>1
cg − 1(
N
2
)
=
1
2
∑
g : cg≥1
(
1
|D| −
1(
N
2
))+ 1
2
∑
g : cg≥1
cg − 1(
N
2
) = (1− |D|(
N
2
)) ,
where the inequality uses again that |D| ≤ (N2 ), and the last equality uses that ∑g:cg≥1 cg = (N2 )
equals the number of pairwise sums.pairwise sums is D = {g : cg ≥ 1}.
We now consider some δ ≤ 1/2 which will be set at the end of the proof and split the sum in
(5) on |D| ≤ (1− δ)(N2 ):
‖(A,X1)− (A,X2)‖s ≤ Pr
[
|D| ≤
(
N
2
)
(1− δ)
]
+ δ · Pr
[
|D| >
(
N
2
)
(1− δ)
]
≤ Pr
[
|D| ≤
(
N
2
)
(1− δ)
]
+ δ ,
where we used the trivial upper bound ‖X1|a −X2|a‖s ≤ 1 when |D| ≤ (1 − δ)
(
N
2
)
and the upper
bound ‖X1|a −X2|a‖s < δ when |D| > (1− δ)
(
N
2
)
by the previous derivation.
We now use Markov’s inequality and Lemma 16 to upper bound the first summand:
‖(A,X1)− (A,X2)‖s ≤ 1
δ
(N
2
) ((N
2
)
− E[|D|])+ δ
≤ 1
δ|G|
(
N
2
)
+ δ ≤ 1
2δN c
+ δ .
where the last inequality uses that |G| ≥ N2+c by assumption. Finally, we set δ = 1/√N c to get
the desired conclusion.
Lemma 16. Let G be an abelian group and let A = (a1, . . . , aN ) be a tuple of N elements drawn
with replacement from G. Define D =
{
ai + aj : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N} to be the set of pairwise sums of
coordinates of A, then: (
N
2
)
− E[|D|] ≤ 1|G|
(
N
2
)2
.
Proof. For each set of two indices {i, j} ⊆ [N ], we define the random variable X{i,j} to be the
indicator that the sum ai + aj collides with ak + al for some {k, l} 6= {i, j}:
X{i,j} = 1
{∃{k, l} 6= {i, j} : ak + al = ai + aj} .
Then, using a union bound and since the probability of a collision is 1/|G|:
E
[
X{i,j}
] ≤ ∑
{k,l}6={i,j}
Pr
[
ai + aj = ak + al
] ≤ (N2 )|G| .
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On the other hand, there are at least as many elements in D as sets of indices {i, j} ⊆ [N ] which
do not collide:
D ≥
∑
{i,j}⊆[N ]
(1 −X{i,j}) =
(
N
2
)
−
∑
{i,j}⊆[N ]
X{i,j} .
Combining the previous two inequalities concludes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 14.
Proof (Theorem 14). Throughout the proof, we fix N and write G,S, T to denote GN , S(n), T (n)
respectively, leaving the parameter n implicit. Suppose, for contradiction, that f is not a one-way
function in the random oracle model with S preprocessing. Then there exists A = (A1,A2) such
that |A1(·)| ≤ S and A2 is PPT, which inverts f with probability at least δ for some non-negligible
δ:
Pr
R,I,J
[
fR
(
AR,A1(R)2
(
fR(I, J)
))
= fR(I, J)
]
≥ δ . (6)
where R : [N ] → G is a random oracle and (I, J) is the distribution of inputs to fR as defined in
Construction 13. Then we use A to build an (S, T ) solver A′ = (A′1,A′2) for 3SUM-Indexing(G,N)
as follows. Given input A = (A1, . . . , AN ) for 3SUM-Indexing(G,N), A′1 defines random oracle
R : [N ] → G such that R(i) = Ai for i ∈ [N ] and outputs A1(R)—this amounts to interpreting
the tuple as a function mapping indices to coordinates. A′2 is identical to A2. By construction,
whenever A2 successfully inverts f (i.e., outputs (i, j) such that fR(i, j) = b for input b), then the
output of A′2 satisfies Ai +Aj = b.
It follows from (6) that A′ as described thus far solves average-case 3SUM-Indexing(G,N)
with success probability δ when given as input a query distributed as fR(I, J). By construc-
tion, the distribution of fR(I, J) is identical to the distribution of AI + AJ for uniformly random
set {I, J} ⊆ [N ], let X1 denote this distribution. However, average-case 3SUM-Indexing(G,N) is
defined with respect to a distribution of queries which is uniform over A + A, let us denote this
distribution by X2. By Lemma 15, we have that ‖(A,X1)−(A,X2)‖s = O(1/
√
N c), hence A2 solves
3SUM-Indexing(G,N) for the correct query distribution X2 with probability at least δ−O(1/
√
N c)
which is non-negligible since δ is non-negligible. Denoting by T the running time of A2, we just
proved that A′ is an (S, T, δ−O(1/√N c)) adversary for average-case 3SUM-Indexing(G,N), which
is a contradiction.
We conjecture that 3SUM-Indexing is (G,N, S, T, ε)-hard with ε = STN2 when G = (Z/N
c
Z,+) for
c ≥ 2. (the standard 3SUM-Indexing problem) and G = ((Z/2Z)kn) for k ≥ 2 (the 3XOR-Indexing
problem). If this conjecture is true, the previous theorem implies the existence of (exponentially
strong) one-way functions in the random oracle model as long the preprocessing satisfies S ≤ N2−δ
for δ > 0. As per the discussion below Definition 11, Theorem 14 is vacuous in the regime where
S = Ω˜(N2).
Open Questions
Our work raises a whole host of open problems. In terms of upper bounds, we showed how to refute
the strong 3SUM-Indexing conjecture of [GKLP17] using techniques from space-time tradeoffs for
function inversion [Hel80, FN00], specifically the general function inversion algorithm of Fiat and
Naor [FN00]. Can we improve the algorithm using the structure of the 3SUM-Indexing problem?
More ambitiously, can we refute the conjecture of Demaine and Vadhan [DV01]?
17
In terms of lower bounds, the natural remaining question is to extend our lower bound to
adaptive strategies that potentially err with some probability.
Our work also opens the door to a new way to immunize cryptographic algorithms against back-
doors, by leveraging on hardness results from the area of static data structures. Can we translate
other (conjectured) static data structure lower bounds into backdoor-immunization schemes?
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